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Abstract
The intelligence leaks fromEdward Snowden in 2013 unveiled the sophistication and extent of data collection by theUnited
States’ National Security Agency and major global digital firms prompting domestic and international debates about the
balance between security and privacy, openness and enclosure, accountability and secrecy. It is difficult not to see a clear
connection with the Snowden leaks in the sharp acceleration of new national security legislations in Australia, a long term
member of the Five Eyes Alliance. In October 2015, the Australian federal government passed controversial laws that re-
quire telecommunications companies to retain the metadata of their customers for a period of two years. The new acts
pose serious threats for the profession of journalism as they enable government agencies to easily identify and pursue
journalists’ sources. Bulk data collections of this type of information deter future whistleblowers from approaching jour-
nalists, making the performance of the latter’s democratic role a challenge. After situating this debate within the scholarly
literature at the intersection between surveillance studies and communication studies, this article discusses the political
context in which journalists are operating and working in Australia; assesses how metadata laws have affected journalism
practices and addresses the possibility for resistance.
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1. Introduction
The intelligence leaks from Edward Snowden in 2013 un-
veiled the sophistication and extent of data collection by
the US’s National Security Agency and major global digi-
tal firms prompting domestic and international debates
about the balance between security and privacy, open-
ness and enclosure, accountability and secrecy (Brevini,
2017).Whilemany authors (Andrejevic, 2002, 2013; Lyon,
2014; Van Dijck, 2014) have warned about massive data
collection by governments and businesses as a challenge
to civil rights, there a need to encourage further public
discussion around the world on the chilling effect that
these data retention frameworks can have on freedom
of the press, on journalists and on their ability to exert
their traditional watchdog function (Lashmar, 2016). Af-
ter situating this debate within the scholarly literature at
the intersection between surveillance studies and com-
munication studies, this article discusses the political con-
text inwhich journalists are operating andworking in Aus-
tralia; assesses howmetadata laws have affected journal-
ism practices and addresses the violation of privacy for
journalists and the emergence of a resistance.
2. From Surveillance Society to Resistance
Surveillance has been defined as the “collection and anal-
ysis of information about populations in order to govern
their activities” (Ericson & Haggerty, 2006, p. 3) so the
literature coming from surveillance studies becomes of
great relevance in investigating the impact of metadata
laws on journalism practices.
Yet, because of the unprecedented development of
information and communication technologies, surveil-
lance scholars have rightly pointed at the new ubiqui-
tousness and embeddedness of surveillance in every as-
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pects of life in current networked societies (Lyon, Hag-
gerty, & Ball, 2012), going much beyond traditional and
centralised institutional settings.
As a consequence of the accelerated development
of a communication technologies, Mann and Ferenbok
(2013) have also explored the possibility for “sousveil-
lance” (Mann & Ferenbok, 2013, p. 19), surveillance
from the bottom up, where the surveilled is empowered
through technology to fight back and enact change from
below through mutual watching and monitoring.
While digital surveillance practices have now been
amply studied within surveillance studies, there is still
great scope for development in the field of communi-
cation studies. In this article, I propose to investigate
whether we can detect a space for resistance for jour-
nalists working within new metadata frameworks. This
space is conceptualised as “field of struggles” (Bordieu,
1983)—a bourdieusian concept—that is helpful in inves-
tigating this space for agency.
In the launch edition of a new journal Big Data and
Society, Couldry and Powell (2014) developed the argu-
ment that a question of agency is paramount to our un-
derstanding of big data, thus opening up a new research
agenda for investigating not only dominant forms of data
power, but also alternative forms of datafication emerg-
ing from civil society groups, community organisations,
journalists .This study takes up this challenge by focusing
specifically on the field of struggle (Bordieu, 1983) where
journalists operate.
2.1. The Australian Context
Since the attacks of September 2001, there has been
a steady increase in number of national security laws
in Australia. Over fifty laws were passed to create new
criminal offences, new detention, extended investigative
powers for security and police officers, new tools to con-
trol people’s movements and activities without criminal
convictions (Ananian-Welsh & Williams, 2014). There is
also a worrying tendency to limit courts’ powers to re-
view the legality of government action especially onmat-
ters of national security. At the same time, there is a
clear trend towards an intensification of government se-
crecy and an extension of its own powers to limit the pub-
lic’s rights of access to information, thus making court
reviews in these areas even more crucial (Human Rights
Law Centre [HRLC], 2016).
In this context, the Snowden leaks (Brevini, 2017) and
their challenges to state secrets can explain the haste
that has characterised discussion and implementation
of three major pieces of new national security laws in
Australia between 2014 and 2015. As Attorney General
George Brandis explained during the reading of the bill
amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisa-
tion Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and the Intelligence Services Act
2001 (IS Act), the reform is justified by a clear intent to
curb whistleblowing activities:
As recent, high-profile international events demon-
strate, in the wrong hands, classified or sensitive in-
formation is capable of global dissemination at the
click of a button. Unauthorised disclosures on the
scale now possible in the online environment can
have devastating consequences for a country’s in-
ternational relationships and intelligence capabilities.
(Brandis, 2014)
The newly created metadata laws cannot be properly
understood without considering the overall context of
increased tightening of national security laws and in-
vestments in cybersecurity. In light of this, the Aus-
tralian government announced in its 2015 budget that
it will provide:
$450 million to strengthen Australia’s intelligence ca-
pabilities, including updating information technology
systems and to counter extremist messaging. This in-
cludes $131 million to help the telecommunications
sector upgrade its systems to retain metadata for two
years. (Australian Government, 2015a)
As I will discuss later, the newly established framework
is clearly at odds with a more recent tendency that is
emerging in courts throughout Europe and the US and
backed by international human rights mandates, where
a clearly hostile attitude towards disproportionate digital
surveillance is being displayed (see for example, Cannat-
aci, 2016; Kaye, 2015).
3. Data Retention in Australia
The revised Telecommunications (Interception and Ac-
cess, TIA) Act, passed in 2015, sought to specify “the
types of data the telecommunications industry should re-
tain for law enforcement and national security purposes
or how long that information should be held”. Rapid, on-
going changes occurring in the telecommunications envi-
ronment have, apparently, “undermined” any systematic
access to the tools and data that may be available (The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a,
p. 2). Recognising the variations that exist in the hold-
ing and maintenance of types of data in the telecommu-
nications industry, the TIA Act demands the “standard-
isation” of such records for governmental use (The Par-
liament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a). It is
claimed that previous inconsistencies have impeded gov-
ernmental efforts to “investigate and to prosecute seri-
ous offences” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 2015a).
Both houses have, therefore, passed this Bill, which
oversees the implementation of a national data reten-
tion scheme. This scheme compels telecommunications
service providers to “retain, for two years, particular
types of telecommunications data” (The Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a).
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The TIA Act cites several recommendations delivered
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee for Intelligence
and Security (PJCIS) as the basis for its framework, includ-
ing that:
• the data retention obligation only applies to
telecommunications data (not content) and inter-
net browsing is explicitly excluded;
• service providers are required to protect the confi-
dentiality of retained data by encrypting the infor-
mation and protecting it from unauthorised inter-
ference or access;
• mandatory data retention will be reviewed by the
PJCIS by three years after its commencement (The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
2015a, p. 3).
Telecommunications data, in this instance, has been
largely characterised as metadata: that is data exclud-
ing “content” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 2015a, p. 7) such as the source and destina-
tion of a communication, subscribers’ information, date,
time and duration of a communication or connection to
a service.1
The 2015–2016 Budget includes $153.8 million over
four years to “support the implementation and ongoing
management” of the data retention scheme, including
$131.3 million over three years for telecommunications
service providers (Australian Government, 2015b).
Access to citizens’ metadata is therefore conferred
without judicial oversight. No warrant is required by the
21 criminal law-enforcement agencies that have been
permitted the capacity to requisition these records (Far-
rell, 2016; The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, 2015a).
The explanatory memorandum for the TIA Act does,
however, set out a “compatibility with human rights”
statement, in accordance with the Human Rights (Parlia-
mentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (The Parliament of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 5). This statement,
which is expanded upon over the course of 30 pages, in-
cludes certain caveats and safeguards to ensure the Act’s
compliance with the upholding of basic civil liberties. It
therefore assures, among other things, that:
The Bill…amends the TIA Act to bolster the privacy
protections associated with the access to, and use of,
telecommunications data. It achieves this by limiting
the agencies which may authorise access to telecom-
munications data, and by providing that agencies’
access to, and use of, telecommunications data is
subject to comprehensive oversight by the Common-
wealthOmbudsman. (The Parliament of the Common-
wealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 6)
The statement asserts that the Bill “is compatible with
human rights because it promotes a number of human
rights”. This is, however, followed by the disclaimer that
“to the extent that (the Bill) may also limit human rights,
those limitations are reasonable, necessary and propor-
tionate” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, 2015a, p. 36).
4. TIA Act and Its Impact on Journalists
In 2015, an amendment to the proposed TIA Act was put
forward in the wake of concerns about how a data reten-
tion scheme might affect the media. It was recognised
that a data retention scheme could “adversely affect”
the media’s capacity “to provide accurate and reliable
information” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 2015b, p. 33) and leave sources vulnerable.
The House of Representatives, thus, agreed to the imple-
mentation of a “journalist information warrant” regime,
which prohibits agencies from “making authorisations to
access journalists or their employers’ data for the pur-
pose of identifying a confidential source unless a jour-
nalist information warrant is in force” (The Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015b, p. 33). This also
means that journalists’ metadata can always be accessed
unless the agency is seeking data specifically for the pur-
pose of identifying a journalist’s source.
It is at the discretion of an “issuing authority” to is-
sue or refuse the authorisation of a journalist informa-
tion warrant, based on their understanding of the public
interest (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, 2015a, p. 79). Issuing authorities are judicial offi-
cers approved by the minister or members of the Admin-
istrative Appeals Tribunal, or lawyers who are appointed
by the minister.
It should also be noted that in the case of ASIO, it
will be the minister that will issue the warrant. (The Par-
liament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 33).
According to the law, information warrants will be issued
only when the “public interest in the issue of the warrant
outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the source” (The Parliament of the Common-
wealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 33).
The installation of (a) Public Interest Advocate(s)
should be an additional measure by which the Act seeks
to establish independence (The Parliament of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 33). The Public Inter-
est Advocate can make submissions to requests for jour-
nalists’ data, defending the need to maintain or discard
1 In January 2016, Australian Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim appealed a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Telstra Corp Ltd and
Privacy Commissioner [2015] AATA 991 of 8 December 2015) that mobile phone metadata held by telecom provider Telstra were not “personal in-
formation” about its customers under the Australian Privacy Act 1988 This appeal has given the Federal Court a landmark opportunity to establish
whether metadata constitutes personal information thus redefining data protection law in Australia. In 19 January 2017 the Federal Court has closed
the case and delivered a groudbreaking decision that will have long lasting implications on how metadata is understood by Australians, and the access
private citizens will be granted to their own data and digital trails: the Court decided that the mobile phone in question was not “personal information”,
effectively enshrining this interpretation into law and drastically narrowing the definition of “personal information” under the Privacy Act.
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confidentiality, which the minister must consider as a
part of the warrant’s application. These may include con-
ditions and/or restrictions (The Parliament of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, 2015a, p. 83). The Public Inter-
est Advocate will, however, not be allowed to seek the
advice of media entities, be it the journalist or the organ-
isation, addressed in the journalist information warrant
(Keane, 2015a). Indeed, the status of journalists and me-
dia organisations as parties subject to a warrant will not
be permitted for disclosure (Keane, 2015a). It is so secret
that there are two-year jail terms for disclosure, of the
mere existence or non existence of a journalist informa-
tionwarrant, while journalists will not be informed of the
request being pursued.
It is difficult not to see the flaws in this system and
its detrimental effects on the practice of journalism. The
journalist information warrant operates in secret, while
journalists and their media organisation will never know
if access was granted. It will still allow journalists’ meta-
data to be accessed to identify a journalist’s sources,
while the public interest advocates won’t be able to ar-
gue in defence of the publicwatchdog role of news organ-
isation and their responsibility to protect the identity of
a source. As journalist Laurie Oakes recalled: “metadata
collection is the great press freedom issue of the inter-
net age”. The aggressive attitude towardswhistleblowers
means that governments “now hunt down those leakers
with zeal and this means that metadata is their friend”
(Oakes, 2015).
5. FromMetadata Laws to Special Intelligence
Operations Reform: Targeting Journalist’s Sources
As discussed, the metadata retention scheme enforced
by TIA 2015 has obvious consequences not only for jour-
nalists but for their sources, and whistleblowers. How-
ever, TIA, combined with another amendment of Aus-
tralian National Security laws, specifically section 35P of
the ASIO has even a greater detrimental impact on jour-
nalists’ sources.
Under Section 35P of the ASIO Act 1979, those who
have “disclosed information relating to a special intel-
ligence operation” may be imprisoned for five to ten
years (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
2014, p. 71). A “special intelligence operation” can be un-
derstood as operations where ASIO agents are granted
legal immunity for engaging in a range of otherwise crim-
inal conduct. The most “basic” breach, in which informa-
tion is simply disclosed, can result in a five-year penalty.
Where a disclosure endangers “the health or safety of
a person”, the Act permits a penalty of ten years. This
penalty applies regardless of whether the citizen or jour-
nalist in question is aware of an operation’s status.
In a report commissioned by the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), the impact of this
piece of legislation is suggested to be twofold: a gag or-
der like 35P may instil a “chill effect” on publications
about the activities of ASIO, and prevent “reprehensible
conduct” by ASIO insiders from being susceptible to pub-
lic scrutiny (DMPC, 2015). According to the report, such
an impact is “unjustified” despite the need for secrecy
in many ASIO operations. The inadequate protection of
the rights of “outsiders”, it argues, “infringes the con-
stitutional protection of freedom of political communi-
cation” (DPMC, 2015). This new provision is concerning
for a number of reasons. First, without an explicit veri-
fication from ASIO, it is extremely difficult for a journal-
ist to know whether an ASIO operation is a special intel-
ligence operation or not. Additionally, the new section
criminalises both intentional and reckless disclosure, so
journalists are likely to take a conservative approach to
publication and avoid pursuing reporting of ASIO’s activi-
ties for fear of being prosecuted. This will indeed lead to
a progressive self-imposed censorship of journalists and
a progressive lack of public reporting in formal publica-
tions or through anonymous disclosures and scrutiny of
intelligence activities.
As the controversy around Australian asylum seek-
ers policy arose, in 2015,2 the Australian Government
expanded secrecy laws frameworks and penalties for
whistleblowers through the controversial Border Force
Act. The legislation makes it unlawful for a Department
of Immigration and Border Protection’s employee or con-
tractor, such as a social worker, a nurse, a doctor or wel-
fare services provider, to disclose or record certain in-
formation obtained while carrying out their duties. The
penalty for such a disclosure is up to two years in jail
(HRLC, 2015).
As The Guardian’s Paul Farrell commented:
This is a move that should alarm all citizens. It’s not
an attack on any particular news outlet. It’s an at-
tack on those who have reported on matters of signif-
icant public interest in the increasingly secretive area
of asylum seeker policy….These kind of attacks [sic]
severely damage the confidence between reporters
and their sources and pose a grave threat to effec-
tive and responsible journalism. When the federal po-
lice go knocking on the doors of a reporter’s sources,
sources will soon dry up. People will be scared. And
that is exactly the point. (Farrell, 2015)
It is important to note that the Border Protection Act has
been amended in October 2016 exempting health pro-
fessionals from the definition of “immigration and bor-
der protection workers” following the pressures coming
from the health professionals who challenged the Gov-
ernment in the High court (Hall, 2016). However, the cur-
rent ban remains in place for others, such as child pro-
tection workers and teachers, who witnessed abuses in
offshore detentions (Hall, 2016).
2 For a good summary of controversial Australian Asylum policies and United Nations (UN) criticism please, see “Australia Asylum: Why Is It Controver-
sial?” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28189608
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6. A Look at the Current International Context
The newly established metadata scheme regime clearly
posits new challenges not only for journalism practices
but for the effectiveness of shield laws which are meant
to prevent journalists from being forced to reveal their
sources. It is also quite unclear how the current Aus-
tralian national framework for data collection corre-
sponds to, or addresses, existing international conven-
tions, treaties or policies on free speech, political, eco-
nomic and cultural inclusion. For example the European
Court of Justice in April 2014 invalidated the EU’s Data Re-
tention Directive, which is very similar to the Australian
scheme. In particular, “the Court held that the Directive
entailed serious interference with the rights to privacy
and personal data protection of individuals guaranteed
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and also failed
to establish limits on access by competent national au-
thorities, such as prior review by a judicial or an indepen-
dent administrative authority” (Data Retention Directive,
2014). The lack of safeguards around the access and use
of metadata was a key reason for the directive to be in
breach of the fundamental right to privacy.
Australia’s attitude towards metadata frameworks is
not unique in international settings. The first report is-
sued by the UN rapporteur on privacy has noted that the
countrymonitoring process of the last year has “revealed
several examples of legislation being rushed through na-
tional parliaments in an effort to legitimise the use of
certain privacy-intrusivemeasures by Security and Intelli-
gence Services (SIS) and lawenforcement agencies” (Can-
nataci, 2016, p. 6). Moreover, the report notes that there
is a contradictory trend between governments and inter-
national attitude towards metadata regimes:
The tensions between security, corporate business
models and privacy continue to take centre stage but
the last twelve months have been marked by con-
tradictory indicators: some governments have con-
tinued, in practice and/or in their parliaments to
take privacy-hostile attitudes while courts world-wide
but especially in the USA and Europe have struck
clear blows in favour of privacy and especially against
disproportionate, privacy-intrusive measures such as
mass surveillance or breaking of encryption. (Cannat-
aci, 2016, p. 21)
The stand of themandate of the International rapporteur
on Privacy (Cannataci, 2016) is consistent with the indi-
cations of the UN, voiced by the former Rapporteur for
Freedom of Information Frank La Rue.
National data retention laws are invasive and costly,
and threaten the rights to privacy and free expression.
By compelling communications service providers to
create large databases of information aboutwho com-
municates with whom via a telephone or the Internet,
the duration of the exchange, and the users’ location,
and to keep such information (sometimes for years),
mandatory data retention laws greatly increase the
scope of State surveillance, and thus the scope for
infringements upon human rights. Databases of com-
munications data become vulnerable to theft, fraud
and accidental disclosure. (La Rue, 2013, p. 18)
The recommendations of the Rapporteur are clearly at
odds with the newly approved Australian framework:
Communications surveillance should be regarded as
a highly intrusive act that potentially interferes with
the rights to freedom of expression and privacy and
threatens the foundations of a democratic society.
Legislation must stipulate that State surveillance of
communications must only occur under the most ex-
ceptional circumstances and exclusively under the su-
pervision of an independent judicial authority. Safe-
guards must be articulated in law relating to the na-
ture, scope and duration of the possible measures,
the grounds required for ordering them, the author-
ities competent to authorize, carry out and supervise
them, and the kind of remedy provided by the na-
tional law. (La Rue, 2013, p. 21)
7. Metadata Laws: Is There Room for Journalists’
Resistance?
I have argued elsewhere (Brevini, 2017) that the rev-
elations by whistleblower Edward Snowden triggered
the birth of a new “new culture of disclosure” that has
seen journalists, lawyers and software developers com-
ing together to develop secure online protections and
security of their sources. One of the most famous ex-
amples are Secure Drop and GlobaLeaks (Brevini, 2017)
projects that aim at supporting the practice of whistle-
blowing by giving people the software tools necessary
to start their own initiative. Unlike WikiLeaks (Brevini
& Murdock, 2013), GlobaLeaks is an open-source soft-
ware provider whose intentions are focussed on provid-
ing a platform for whistleblowers to use. GlobaLeaks
does not handle any leaked documents but assists in
the potential creation of whistleblowing sites such as
OpenLeaks, MafiaLeaks, BalkanLeaks and BrusselsLeaks.
However, there is also a more mainstream response to
metadata laws: The New Yorker, the US not-for-profit
investigative newsroom ProPublica, the Pierre Omidyar-
backed start-up The Intercept and The Guardian are just
a few examples of news providers that implemented
a newly created open-source whistleblowing platform-
SecureDrop to guarantee protections for their sources
(Brevini, 2017).
In Australia,3 the only platform of this kind is medi-
adirect.org, a platform that aims to encourage encrypted
3 The paper adopted a multilayered methodological approach that combines policy and legal analysis with interviews with ten investigative Journalists
in Australia that prefer to keep their anonymity.
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disclosure by anonymous whistleblowers, thus protect-
ing sources from the newly enhanced metadata laws.
With a budget of about US$ 3,000 (Interview B)4 the plat-
form through encrypted interactions connects whistle-
blowers, who access it via the Tor network, and journal-
ists (Keane, 2015b).
In light of the new metadata frameworks imple-
mented in Australia, one would expect journalists rush-
ing to demand an improved set of encryption tools, as
well as formal training on anonymity mechanisms to pro-
tect their sources. However, our findings confirm not
only a lack of knowledge of encrypting communications
but also a lack of understanding of the risks of the newly
established frameworks (Interview A, 2016).5
As one security consultant revealed:
In a recent example, I just set them up to deal with
the data, because they did not know how to deal with
a major data leak. And when I got in there for the first
meeting, one of the journalists said, “We’ll print every-
thing out”. And I’m shocked: it’s a million pages and
hundreds of thousands of emails, how can we possi-
bly print them? (Interview B, 2016)
Improving journalists’ knowledge of encryption tools and
their awareness ofmetadata laws should be a priority for
media organisations, and perhaps one of the goals for
Media Entertainment Alliance Australia.
Interviewees seemed to agree that the reasons for
media institutions not to invest in security tools and train-
ing for their journalists has to do with the current finan-
cial crisis of journalism and the precarious conditions
of reporters: when faced with the clear risk of losing
their job, journalists are less keen to take risks and ex-
pose wrongdoings.
8. Conclusion
The newly established metadata scheme regime in Aus-
tralia clearly undermines the work of journalists and
the effectiveness of shield laws which were due to pro-
tect journalists from being forced to reveal their sources.
As Crikey journalist Bernard Keane noted: “The threat
arises from the existence and maintenance of data. That
creates the chilling effect. You don’t need a warrant
to investigate a journalist if the agency can access the
data of the whole department that the leak came from”
(Keane 2015a).
The chilling effect on journalists and whistleblowers’
activities are very consistent with findings of the schol-
arship in surveillance studies that have detected for ex-
ample a similar pattern of “self censorship” on activists’s
or civil society groups’ activities (see for example, Starr,
Fernandez, Amster, Wood, & Caro, 2008).
There are obviously limits to what encryption and
anonymity technologies can do to protect journalism
practices, but the Australian case certainly shows that,
aside from a few exceptions, journalists are currently not
well equipped with the necessary know-how and aware-
ness. In Bordieu’s terms, journalists in the Australian con-
text have not fully developed the resources or “capi-
tal” (Bordieu, 1983) to successfully oppose the collec-
tion and processing of personal data, thus developing
a space for resistance to surveillance, radically different
from “sousveillance” (Mann & Ferenbok, 2013).
It should also be noted that the findings of this study
diverge from a recent study by Mills and Sarikakis (2016)
that focused only on investigative journalists and found
how investigative journalist in Western and non West-
ern countries are engaging increasingly with technolog-
ical and other communities to defend their work. Fu-
ture research from Communication Studies perspective
should engage with this recent scholarship to shed light
on the crucial interplay between new metadata frame-
works and journalism.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Ananian-Welsh, R., &Williams, G. (2014). New terrorists:
The normalisation and spread of anti-terror laws in
Australia. The Melbourne University Law Review, 38,
362–408.
Andrejevic, M. (2002). The work of watching one an-
other: Lateral surveillance, risk, and governance.
Surveillance & Society, 2(4), 479–497.
Andrejevic, M. (2013). Infoglut: How too much informa-
tion is changing the way we think and know. Oxford:
Routledge.
Australian Information Commissioner. (2015). Ben
Grubb and Telstra Corporation Limited. Austlii.
Retrieved from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
cth/AICmr/2015/35.html
Bourdieu, P. (1983). The field of cultural production,
or: The economic world reversed. Poetics, 12(4/5),
311–356.
Brandis, G. (2014). National Security Legislation Amend-
ment Bill (No. 1) 2014, Second reading. Parliament
of Australia. Retrieved from http://parlinfo.aph.gov.
au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBE
R;id=chamber%2Fhansards%2F232fa1a8-d7e8-4b22
-9018-1a99b5a96812%2F0116;query=Id%3A%22cha
mber%2Fhansards%2F232fa1a8-d7e8-4b22-9018-1a
99b5a96812%2F0173%22
Brevini, B. (2017). WikiLeaks: Between disclosure and
whistle- blowing in digital times. Sociology Compass,
1(3), 1–11.
Brevini, B., & Murdock, G. (2013). Following the money:
WikiLeaks and the political economy of disclosure. In
4 Interview via Skype, 10 May 2016.
5 Interview via Skype, 3 May 2016.
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 76–83 81
B. Brevini, A. Hintz, & P. McCurdy (Eds.), Beyond Wik-
iLeaks: Implications for the future of communications,
journalism and society (pp. 35–55). Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Cannataci, J. A. (2016). Report of the special rappor-
teur on the right to privacy. Human Rights Council.
Retrieved from www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Privacy/A-HRC-31-64.doc
Couldry, N., & Powell, A. (2014). Big data from the
bottom up. Big Data & Society, 1(2). doi:10.1177/
2053951714539277
Data Retention Directive. (2014). European Union: ECJ
invalidates data retention directive. Retrieved from
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/eu-data-retention-dir
ective/eu.php
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (2015).
Report on the impact on journalists of section
35P of the ASIO Act. Retrieved from https://www.
dpmc.gov.au/pmc/publication/report-impact-journ
alists-section-35p-asio-act
Ericson, R. V., & Haggerty, K. D. (2006). The new politics
of surveillance and visibility. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Farrell, P. (2015). Journalism is not a crime. So why are
reporters being referred to police? The Guardian.
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/com
mentisfree/2015/jan/22/journalism-is-not-a-so-why
-are-reporters-being-referred-to-police
Farrell, P. (2016). Lamb chop weight enforcers want
warrantless access to Australians’ metadata. The
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/jan/19/lamb-chop-weight-enforce
rs-want-warrantless-access-to-australians-metadata
Hall, B. (2016). ‘A huge win for doctors’: Turnbull govern-
ment backs down on gag laws for doctors on Naurus
and Manus. Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/a-huge-win-for-doctors-turnbull-government-
backs-down-on-gag-laws-for-doctors-on-nauru-and-
manus-20161019-gs6ecs.html
Human Rights Law Centre. (2016). Safeguarding
democracy. Retrieved from http://www.bmartin.cc/
dissent/documents/rr/HRLC16.pdf
Kaye, D. (2015). Report of the special rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the right to free-
dom of opinion and expression. Human Rights
Council. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/361
Keane, B. (2015a). Finally the Labor coalition surveillance
deal revealed. Crikey. Retrieved from http://www.
crikey.com.au/2015/03/19/finally-the-labor-coalition
-surveillance-deal-revealed/?wpmp_switcher=mobile
Keane, B. (2015b). Media direct: Towards better security
for whistleblowers. Crikey. Retrieved from https://
www.crikey.com.au/2014/05/26/media-direct-towar
ds-better-security-for-whistleblowers
La Rue, F. (2013). Report of the special rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression. United Nations
Human Rights. Retrieved from http://ap.ohchr.org/
documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40
Lashmar, P. (2016). No more sources? The impact of
Snowden’s revelations on journalists and their con-
fidential sources. Journalism Practice. doi:10.1080/
17512786.2016.1179587
Lyon, D., Haggerty, K. D., & Ball, K. (2012). Introducing
surveillance studies. In D. Lyon, K. D. Haggerty, & K.
Ball (Eds.), Routledge handbook of surveillance stud-
ies (pp. 1–12). Oxford: Routledge.
Lyon, D. (2014). Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: Ca-
pacities, consequences, critique. Big Data & Society,
1(2), 1–13.
Mann, S., & Ferenbok, J. (2013). New media and the
power politics of sousveillance in a surveillance-
dominated world. Surveillance & Society, 11(1/2),
1–13.
Mills, A., & Sarikakis, K. (2016). Reluctant activists?
The impact of legislative and structural attempts of
surveillance on investigative journalism. Big Data &
Society, 3(2), 1–13.
Oakes, L. (2016). Speech delivered at the Melbourne
Press Club, 27 September 2015. Retrieved from
http://www.melbournepressclub.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/150925_Melbourne_Press_Free
dom_Dinner_Oakes_speech.pdf
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.
(2014). National security legislation amendment
bill (No. 1) 2014: Bill as passed by both houses.
Parliament of Australia. Retrieved from http://www.
aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation
/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s969
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.
(2015a). Telecommunications (Intercept and Access)
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2015: Revised
explanatory memorandum. Parliament of Australia.
Retrieved from http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliament
ary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/
Result?bId=r5375
The Parliament of the Commonwealth Australia. (2015b).
Data Retention Bill: Budget Review 2015–16. Par-
liament of Australia. Retrieved from http://www.
aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Depar
tments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetRevie
w201516/Telco
AustralianGovernment. (2015a). Budget 2015. Retrieved
from http://www.budget.gov.au/2015-16/content/
highlights/nationalsecurity.html
Australian Government. (2015b). Budget 2015–16 (Bud-
get Paper no.2). Retrieved from http://www.budget.
gov.au/2015-16/content/bp2/download/BP2_consol
idated.pdf
Privacy Commissioner. (2015). Privacy Commissioner
lodges appeal to Federal Court re Telstra Corporation
Limited v Privacy Commissioner. Office of the Aus-
tralian Information Commissioner. Retrieved from
https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/state
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 76–83 82
ments/privacy-commissioner-lodges-appeal-to-fede
ral-court-re-telstra-corporation-limited-v-privacy-com
missioner
Starr, A., Fernandez, L. A., Amster, R., Wood, L. J., & Caro,
M. J. (2008). The impacts of state surveillance on po-
litical assembly and association: A socio-legal analy-
sis. Qualitative Sociology, 31(3), 251–270.
Van Dijck, J. (2014). Datafication, dataism and dataveil-
lance: Big data between scientific paradigm and ide-
ology. Surveillance & Society, 12(2), 197–208.
About the Author
Benedetta Brevini is Senior Lecturer in Communication andMedia at the University of Sydney, Visiting
Fellow of Centre for Law Justice and Journalism at City University and Research Associate at Sydney
Cyber Security Network. She is co-editor of the volume Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future
of Communications, Journalism & Society (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) and the author of Public Service
Broadcasting Online: A Comparative European Policy Study of PSB 2.0 (Palgrave MacMillan in August
2013). Before joining academia she has been working as a journalist in Milan, New York and London.
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 76–83 83
